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Plato’s Housing Policy:  Then and Now 
 
 Plato put housing second only to a secure food supply in the order of business of an 
emerging polis;1 we argue, without quibbling over rank, that adequate housing ought to have 
fundamental priority, with health and education, in civil societies’ planning, budgets, and legisla-
tive agendas.  Something made explicit in the Platonic Laws,2 and often reiterated by today’s 
poor—but as often forgotten by bureaucrats—is that human wellbeing, eudaimonia, is impossi-
ble for the homeless.  That is, adequate housing is valuable to human societies independently of 
its instrumental role in supporting the safety, health, and education of the populace.  Currently, 
governments all too frequently end up undermining their own health and education programs as a 
direct result of neglecting the housing needs of the poor.  Finally, we argue that governments 
ought now to be using the low-cost ways that already exist to provide, or to promote the provi-
sion of, better housing for their increasingly urbanized populations; further, even in those cir-
cumstances where it is necessary to subsidize housing, governments’ most important role is to 
develop just regulatory and enforcement systems within which public- and private-sector in-
vestment can operate.    
 Conditions in Athens in the late fifth and early fourth centuries B.C.E. are repeated in 
many developing countries now.  For example, as the predominantly agricultural subsistence 
economy became a market economy in which manufacture and trade were dominant, urbaniza-
tion increased; and war exacerbated the trend because outlying areas were more apt to be raided.  
As rural-urban migration increased, homesteads that had once been large enough to support the 
extended families that together formed the household were broken up into units that were let to 
tenants working elsewhere.  But the number of homesteads was also increased, and their size was 
reduced, by Athens’ requirement that all sons inherit equally (and daughters not at all).  Eventual 
overcrowding led to disease and famine in the time of Plato’s youth,3 again made worse by war.  
Lending arose out of reciprocal gift-giving, but by Plato’s time had long been a legally regulated 
arrangement among groups of family or neighbors who provided for one another in time of need 
and who originally expected nothing but the repayment of their own contributions in return, 
much like stokvels in South Africa, early building societies in the U.K., and early credit unions in 
the U.S.—associations not run for profit.  Athenian social upheaval brought the advent of banks 
that offered to lend at interest and to protect cash deposits from burglars.  The banks—initially 
invisible to the regulated economy—enabled the wealthy to avoid paying taxes, which led to 
greater extremes of wealth and poverty, extremes that worsened class conflict.4  Then as now, the 
                                                
1 Republic 2.369d; clothing is third. 
2 One of us is on record doubting that Plato authored a significant portion of the dialogue; it is Platonic by virtue of 
its having been authored in Plato’s Academy during and soon after Plato taught there.  See Debra Nails and Holger 
Thesleff, “Early Academic Editing:  Plato’s Laws,” in The Laws:  Selected Papers from the VI Symposium Platoni-
cum, eds. Samuel Scolnicov and Luc Brisson, pp. 14–29.  International Plato Series (Academia Verlag, 2003). 
3 Thucydides 2.47–70. 
4 In our discussion of ancient fiscal matters, we have relied more on Edward E. Cohen, Athenian Economy and Soci-
ety:  A Banking Perspective (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1992) than on Paul Millett, Lending and Bor-
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two abiding economic problems were acknowledged to be redistribution of land and cancellation 
of debt.5 
 Against that backdrop, Platonic policy recommendations are not particularly surprising,6 
yet the theoretical urban plan of the Laws is offered subject to revision in light of practical cir-
cumstances.  Its elements can be stated briefly.  The land, sufficient to support the population in 
a moderate way of life,7 was divided equally, one homestead per family—not by size of lot or 
number of family members, but by the homestead’s potential for production.  Each homestead 
included two properties, one urban, one rural, a division that served some important purposes:  it 
enabled the urban members of the household to participate actively in government; it protected 
the rural agricultural base; it allowed siblings or generations of a family, a single economic unit 
called a ‘household’, to live separately from one another.  Each homestead, however, was re-
quired to remain in the family to which it was originally assigned and, because ultimate owner-
ship was communal across the polis, neither parts nor the whole could be bought or sold except 
to the polis.8  Thus the number of homesteads could never change.  The equality of the sexes fa-
miliar from the Republic is retained in the Laws, so females could inherit, and dowries were 
abolished; inheritance of the homestead itself, however, was limited to one child chosen by the 
parents; other children might of course continue to live, work, and rear families there, but they 
were also free to marry or adopt into different families, or to take their share of the wealth else-
where to build anew.  The state’s fixed size implied a relatively fixed population as well, so a 
variety of methods of keeping the population constant, all well established in Athenian law, were 
incorporated:  marriage, adoption, inhibition and stimulation of both birth and birthrate, and col-
onization.9  It is worth noting the Platonic nod to cultural differences:  indigenous traditions were 
to remain unmolested in the state and used as occasions for public fraternizing.10  As in Athens, 
laws were to be provided in written form.11  While there was to be currency for daily require-
ments such as business deals and the paying of wages,12 the citizens of the polis were not to be 
permitted to keep gold or silver coins.13  Lending at interest was forbidden.14  Class conflict was 
to be avoided by a prohibition on the extremes of wealth and poverty.15  In fact, poverty was 
supposed to be eliminated because no one could own less than the value of the homestead itself, 
including all the furnishings and implements required to use it; in other words, everyone’s basic 
needs were met.  The limit on wealth was four times the value of the homestead, with all surplus 
reverting to the polis.16  Cuba chose the same one-to-four ratio after its revolution but later found 
it necessary to widen the ratio to discourage urban influx.   
 What the author of the Laws adds is that human beings in some sense require a home-
stead; that is, they cannot achieve fulfillment, a satisfying life, without a home, an oikos.  It is 
                                                                                                                                                       
rowing in Ancient Athens (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1991).   
5 Laws 5.736c–737b; cf. 3.683a–693d. 
6 Most appear 5.737c–747e.  All Stephanus page references below refer to Laws, unless otherwise identified. 
7 5.737c–e. 
8 Cf. 5.741b–c. 
9 5.740d; cf. 5.746a. 
10 5.738b–e, cf. 3.693b; the traditions were primarily religious ones (sacrifices, temples, oracles, etc.). 
11 5.741c; cf. 7.793b–c. 
12 Cf. Republic 2.371b–d. 
13 5.741e–742b; but cf. 7.819b–c for gold and silver dishes. 
14 5.742c. 
15 5.744d; cf. 3.679b–c. 
16 5.744e–745a. 
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human nature to want a home,17 a potentially permanent abode that is valued not merely as a 
shelter from the elements or as an investment, but for itself.  In Plato’s time, having a homestead 
ensured having  an economic life (the means to support oneself and one’s loved ones through 
production and trade), and a political life (social relations and activity in a secure and orderly 
environment, the polis, where other goods such as education and health were also valued and 
achievable).  One thing that remains the same across these thousands of years is that the means 
then available for providing adequate housing to the populace are the means available:  there is 
no quick technological fix for housing as some expect in health care and education. 
 Eschewing recourse to “human nature,” the United Nations prefers to call decent housing 
a basic human need and “one of the essential components of sustainable development.”18  Sur-
veys in the less developed countries show time and again that housing is the most prevalent un-
satisfied basic need,19 and the situation has become worse over the 1990s.  Adequate housing is 
declared a right in The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and various other international 
covenants and conventions.20  Whether need, nature, or right, philosophers can at least agree on 
the importance of housing as an instrumental good that lifts people out of poverty:  properly 
planned, it protects migrants from settling informally in dangerous areas of mudslides, fires, 
floods, and hazardous waste, while preventing environmental degradation.  When building codes 
are properly written and enforced, housing provides a reasonable degree of safety from such nat-
ural disasters as earthquakes and from the man-made disasters of faulty installation and inferior 
materials.  Initially, housing creates construction-sector jobs preparing the infrastructure (e.g., 
roads, utilities) as well as erecting buildings.  By securing clean water and sanitation, and guard-
ing against overcrowding, a sound housing policy promotes better hygiene and health.  The pro-
vision of adequate living space in the area where inhabitants can work, attend school, play safely, 
shop, and find primary health care, affords other benefits:  lower absenteeism and crime, higher 
literacy, social inclusion, family stability, and civic pride—in short, a higher Physical Quality of 
Life Index for the household, and a higher Human Development Index for the state.21  If housing 
policy is keyed to home ownership, as opposed to tenancy only, the possibility of using the home 
as collateral for loans is conveyed, and with it the prospect of buying seed for planting, a ma-
chine for production, higher education, et al.; this makes financial independence realizable for 
low-income groups, but it necessitates an even greater governmental role in the regulation and 
enforcement of liens, titles and registrations, and in facilitating access to credit and accelerating 
construction—essential for attracting further public- and private-sector investment in housing.   
 What we have just described is a long continuum, both less and more than Plato envi-
sioned:  less, because the majority of government housing projects fail as proper homesteads in 
                                                
17 The sense of human nature we have in mind for “to want a home” is comparable to that of “to use language” or 
“to bond with their caregivers”:  there are human beings who are exceptions, but these are rare in the species.    
18 See <http:www.un.org/esa/sustdev/indisd/isd-ms2001.htm> accessed 10 July 2002, covering the Habitat and Hab-
itat II conferences on human settlements, the Commission on Human Settlements, and the Global Shelter Strategy. 
19 Both “less developed countries” (LDCs) and “unsatisfied basic need” (UBN) are technical terms:  the United Na-
tions regularly updates its list of LDCs, determined by indices of life expectancy, literacy rates, and access to health 
services and safe water. 
20 See the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion Against Women; and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
21 The PQLI and the HDI are instruments used by the United Nations, but sometimes criticized for having too few 
variables and being too strongly tied to health and education; the Human Suffering Index and the Human Poverty 
Index are often added. 
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that they are not intended as permanent dwellings for their tenants, and are not inheritable; they 
are temporary housing for low-income tenants working their way out of poverty.  These projects 
undermine their own goals:  the depth of psychological commitment that leads to family and 
community stability is incompatible with the inherently temporary arrangement.  On the other 
hand, if governments put their efforts into improving market conditions—lowering interest rates, 
facilitating access to credit, tightening regulation and enforcement—and depend solely on the 
private sector to enable the poor to own homes by financing mortgages, then we have moved far 
from Plato’s policy in the opposite direction.  And here we reach the philosophical crux of the 
matter:  what level of risk for what level of gain ought to be tolerated in a just society?   
 In  Plato’s view, when farmers need seed, or merchants capital, they can pledge a harvest 
or anticipated profit, but it is unthinkable that a borrower’s family should lose the homestead if 
draught, locusts, or an economic downturn should strike.  Rather, the lender shares the risk.  In 
the West, government also shares the risk through disaster relief for farmers and bankruptcy pro-
tection for merchants—it establishes a limit on loss, a safety net.  We believe that legislatures 
should move toward such protections for borrowers and lenders, thereby spreading risk.22  But 
the reality in most of the world is that governments lack the funds to insure against natural disas-
ters, much less business losses.  Thus all risk is shifted to the lender, and the risk is high because 
foreclosure—which is a real possibility in the U.S.—is rare or nonexistent outside the West:  
even where permitted under law, enforcement is either lax or effectively prevented by judicial 
systems, if not by neighbors.  If a lender, whether private or not-for-profit, cannot foreclose un-
der any circumstances whatever, s/he cannot lend, or cannot lend at rates the poor can afford to 
pay, so the cycle of poverty remains unbroken.23   
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22 We say governments but acknowledge that in countries where corruption is particularly widespread, government 
is a negative influence on housing markets. 
23 See Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital:  Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else 
(New York : Basic Books, 2000). 
